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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
IN RE J.J.: IN A CHILD IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE
PROCEEDING, TRUTH-COMPETENCY IS NOT A
PREREQUISITE TO THE ADMISSION OF A CHILD'S OUT-
OF-COURT STATEMENT.
By: Kelly Gillett
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to Section 11-304
of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Code ("Section 11-304"), a child's
hearsay statement concerning abuse was admissible in a Child in Need of
Assistance ("CINA") hearing without a preliminary competency
determination of the child. In re J.J., 456 Md. 428, 456, 174 A.3d 372, 388
(2017). Further, the court held that the lower court properly admitted the
child's statements since it had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id. at 456, 174 A.3d at 388.
In August 2015, a nine-year-old female, J.J., told her maternal
grandmother that her father had sexually abused her. Following J.J.'s
allegations, the Department of Social Services removed J.J. from her father's
home and filed a CINA petition. The Department of Social Services filed a
notice of intent to introduce an audio-recording of J.J.'s statements
concerning her father's sexual abuse. The audio recording was the result of
an interview with a licensed clinical social worker. A Section 11-304
hearing was held and J.J.'s statements were admitted after the court found
that all thirteen statutory factors had been established. Subsequently, during
the CINA proceeding, J.J. did not testify, and the court did not conduct an
independent examination of J.J. to determine if her out-of-court statements
had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
After the Section 11-304 hearing, the Circuit Court for Wicomico County
proceeded with the CINA adjudication. During this proceeding the court
held that J.J.'s out-of-court statement was admissible to prove the truth of the
matter asserted because it possessed the requisite "guarantees of
trustworthiness." The court determined that, in accordance with Section 11-
304(g)(1), the recording of J.J. made an examination of the child's
competency to understand the difference between truth and fabrication
unnecessary. The parents of J.J. appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, which affirmed, holding that a juvenile court is not required to
determine a child's truth competency when determining the admissibility of
an out-of-court statement. The parents subsequently filed a writ of certiorari
to the Court of Appeals of Maryland which was granted.
Three issues were presented to the court of appeals for review. In re JJ,
456 Md. at 446-47, 174 A.3d at 383. First, whether a determination of a
child's competency was required prior to admitting the child's hearsay
statement at a CINA adjudication hearing. Id. at 446, 174 A.3d at 383.
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Second, if an independent examination of J.J. was necessary to establish that
she was competent. Id. at 447, 174 A.3d at 383. Finally, whether J.J.'s
hearsay statements contained the requisite "guarantees of trustworthiness" to
be admissible as required by CP § 11-304. Id. at 446-47, 174 A.3d 382-83.
The court began its analysis by examining the statute itself in addressing
the issue of the J.J.'s competency. In re JJ, 456 Md. at 449, 174 A.3d at
384. If the plain meaning of the statue is unclear, the court will look at the
context of the statutory scheme to determine the General Assembly's intent.
In re J.J, 456 Md. at 449, 174 A.3d at 384 (2017) (citing Phillips v. State,
451 Md. 180, 196, 152 A.3d 712 (2017); Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 551,
165 A.3d 398 (2017). The court of appeals explained that Section 11-304 is
silent on whether the court is required to make a determination of truth-
competency as a prerequisite when ruling on the admissibility of a child's
hearsay statement. In re J.1, 456 Md. at 449, 174 A.3d at 384. Therefore,
the court considered the legislative history of the statute. Id.
Upon examining the legislative history of Section 11-304, the court
determined that the General Assembly did not intend for the juvenile court to
determine a child's truth competency. In re JJ., 456 Md. at 449-50, 174
A.3d at 384. The statute had no competency requirement in place when
enacted, and only one bill had been introduced that proposed adding the
requirement. Id. at 450, 174 A.3d at 385. However, the proposed change
was stricken from the bill prior to its enactment. Id. The court concluded
that Section 11-304 was not ambiguous, and that neither the plain language
of the statute, nor the legislative history required a juvenile court to
determine a child's truth competency before admitting that child's hearsay
statement. Id. Consequently, the court determined that it need not address
J.J.'s truth competency. Id. at 452, 174 A.3d at 386.
Additionally, the court found that the foundational requirements of the
statute made a competency determination irrelevant. In re J.J, 456 Md. at
450-51, 174 A.3d at 385. Section 11-304 provides specific conditions that
must be met before a victim child's hearsay statements can be admitted. Id.
at 451, 174 A.3d at 385. The conditions include a finding that an
examination is unnecessary, that there is corroborative evidence, and that the
hearsay statement contains "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id.
Next, applying a clearly erroneous standard of review, the court examined
the statutory factors regarding the trustworthiness requirement. In re J.J,
456 Md. at 452, 174 A.3d at 386. Finding an examination of J.J.
unnecessary, the court was persuaded by the fact that the lower court played
the audio recording of her hearsay statement, listened to testimony and
arguments, and then evaluated the evidence. Id. at 454, 174 A.3d at 387.
Moreover, the court concluded that the father's statement that he was living
with J.J. provided sufficient corroborative evidence of his opportunity to
commit the abuse. Id. Additionally, J.J.'s in-depth personal knowledge of
the event and sensory detail led the court to determine that the statements had
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the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," satisfying the foundational
requirements of the statute. Id.
The court then turned to the issue raised by J.J.'s parents concerning the
consistent repetition of statements. In re J.J., 456 Md. at 455, 174 A.3d at
387. The parents asserted that J.J.'s statements were not trustworthy because
she did not repeat them consistently. Id. at 455, 174 A.3d at 387-88.
However, the court found no such requirement in Section 11-304. Id.
Ultimately, it held that any inconsistencies in the child's statements went to
the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence. Id. Thus, the juvenile
court did not err in concluding that J.J.'s hearsay statement possessed the
"guarantees of trustworthiness," and properly admitted the statements into
evidence. Id. at 455-56, 174 A.3d at 388.
In the instant case, the court of appeals held that the juvenile court did not
err in concluding that J.J.'s out-of-court statement contained the guarantees
of trustworthiness, and thus was admissible. The court held that Section 11-
304 does not require a competency determination prior to admitting a child's
hearsay statements. In addition, the court is refusing to afford parents the
right of confrontation against their child in court. This will make it easier for
counsel to present statements even when the child is available. The decision
affirms the judicial system's intent to protect children from the traumatic
experience of being in a court room, and having to litigate the abuse in the
presence of their alleged abuser. The holding exemplifies the court's
continued efforts to put the child's best interest above that of the parent's in
court proceedings.
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